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This paper studies the consequences of using a debt contract to raise venture capital for 
an entrepreneurial project in an adverse selection setting with different quality venture 
capitalists.  The paper considers not only the likelihood of success of a one-time project being 
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dependent on the quality of the venture capitalist, but also the problem of a reduced ownership 
value of future rents from the venture if the venture capitalist takes it over as the result of 
default of the entrepreneur. Expressions for the face value of debt required for pooling and 
separating equilibria are also derived. The existence of a separating equilibrium with bad 
quality venture capitalists is used to show how less reputable venture capitalists can survive in 
the marketplace. Finally, the paper uses a numerical example to demonstrate why the 
entrepreneurs of more profitable entrepreneurial firms may prefer to do business with bad 
quality venture capitalists. 
 
I. Introduction 
 Venture capitalists normally do considerably more than invest passively in 
entrepreneurial ventures.  They also offer extensive project monitoring and provide expertise 
continuously through their involvement in crucial areas such as strategic decision-making, 
technology assessment, market analysis, risk/return determination, and management recruiting.  
In fact venture capitalists frequently provide value-added services for the emerging company 
well beyond the funds they generate (Schilit, 1996). A venture capitalist‟s value to the 
entrepreneurial firm therefore depends in part on the value the capitalist can bring to the 
entrepreneurial firm in terms of such valued-added services. In addition, there is strong 
empirical evidence to suggest that high quality added venture capitalist activities are greatly 
needed, as Dorsey (1977) and Huntsman and Hoban (1980) report failure rates of 18% and 16% 
respectively for companies with venture capital investments in their first five to seven years of 
existence, whereas Schilit (1996) states that the success rate for all new companies is about 
10% to 20%. 
It is only natural to expect that the value of these added venture capitalist services 
beyond providing financing would vary with the quality and experience of the venture 
capitalist.  Whereas the ability of the reputable venture capitalist to provide superior services of 
this kind to the entrepreneur may not be in much doubt, the efficacy of younger and less 
established venture capitalists in providing these services may not be as clear.  Thus we may 
envisage a population of young venture capital firms with an unproven track record of success, 
who can provide no clear signal as to their abilities. This is supported by Gompers (1996), who 
finds that younger and, therefore, less established venture capitalists bring IPOs earlier to the 
market than do more reputable venture capitalists in order to signal their quality to the market 
and to attract investment more easily for follow-on venture projects.  
This paper examines the consequences of raising venture capital using a debt contract 
when the quality of the venture capitalist is subject to adverse selection.  We consider not only 
the likelihood of success of a one-time project being dependent on the quality of the venture 
capitalist, but also the future rents from the venture being dependent upon the project‟s 
ownership after the proceeds from the one-time project are realized.  
When an entrepreneur considers a young venture capitalist firm for external debt 
financing, it is unable to observe the quality of the venture capitalist.  One good and one bad 
type of venture capitalist are considered in our model.  With a good type venture capitalist, the 
project of the entrepreneur has a greater chance of success than with a bad type venture 
capitalist. In practice, a reputable venture capitalist belonging to the good type would 
 17  
eventually separate out to a certain degree, since her abilities would be publicly known.
1
  An 
adverse selection model that includes reputable venture capitalists would be uninteresting, and, 
as a result, we can envisage our adverse selection model as containing only young and 
inexperienced venture capital firms who can belong to what eventually will become either the 
good or the bad type depending upon the number of years of their eventual existence.  But why 
should we study young and inexperienced venture capital firms?  Gompers (1996) mentions 
that it would be interesting to study why entrepreneurs do business with younger venture 
capitalists who, as noted above, would likely rush them into an early IPO, rather than 
contracting with older and more reputable venture capitalists who are more likely to bring 
about firm value maximizing IPOs. So why would entrepreneurs who have a choice between a 
reputable firm of proven skill and ability and a young firm, whose abilities are as yet unproven, 
choose to do business with the latter?  While the present study does not explicitly model an 
entrepreneur‟s choice between older and more reputable venture capitalist firms (whose quality 
is publicly known) and younger and less reputable capitalist firms, by examining the 
contractual implications of an entrepreneur selecting young venture capital firms under 
adversity, it derives the conditions under which bad quality venture capitalists may survive in 
the market place (in a separating equilibrium).
2
 This in turn may help explain how less 
reputable (or younger) venture capital firms can survive in the marketplace. We also use a 
numerical example to explain how more profitable entrepreneurial firms may prefer to (debt) 
finance their projects with bad quality venture capitalists rather than with good quality ones.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II reviews some of the important 
related literature in the area of venture capital financing.  Section III discusses the setup of the 
model.  Section IV considers the conditions under which a pooling equilibrium might be 
feasible. Section V examines separating equilibria and Section VI looks at social welfare 
maximization.  Section VII discusses the viability of less reputable (bad quality) venture 
capitalist firms in the marketplace, and uses a numerical example to explain how 
entrepreneurial firm profitability can affect the viability of such venture capitalists. Finally, 
Section VIII provides concluding remarks. 
 
II. Literature Review 
This section reviews some of the literature related to venture capitalist quality and the 
quality of venture capital investments, and presents a short summary of some literature on 
moral hazard problems in venture capital.  
Lerner (1994) looks at the syndication of venture capital investments, and finds that 
reputable venture capitalists syndicate first-round investments to venture investors with similar 
levels of expertise.  In later rounds, the reputable venture capitalists syndicate the venture to 
both their peers, as well as to less-experienced venture capital investors. Gompers (1998) finds 
that the booming market for venture-backed IPO‟s, coupled with recent reductions in the 
capital gains tax-rate, led to an increase in the profitability of venture capitalism and caused 
venture capitalists to dramatically increase their capital commitments to new ventures. Also, an 
increase in the level of new funds raised by venture capitalists forced many of them to seek an 
even greater number of venture investment opportunities, which helps explain the shift by 
                                                          
1
 According to Gompers (1996) the age of the venture capitalist proxies for reputation, implying that disreputable 
venture capitalists (belonging to a bad type) would not survive a long time in the marketplace; i.e., eventual 
bankruptcy would remove a potentially disreputable venture capitalist from the market. 
2
 Specifically, under a debt contract. 
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venture capitalists to later stage investments. Studies of the incentives of venture capitalists to 
engage in value reducing behavior have concentrated on the premature abandonment decision. 
Sahlman (1990) argues that premature abandonment (through an IPO) may come about due to 
the fact that the venture capitalist holds a more diversified portfolio of opportunities and has a 
higher opportunity cost of time (as more profitable ventures may become available) than the 
entrepreneur. According to Gompers (1996), the venture capitalist may also bring about a 
premature IPO in order to both signal her reputation and cause a revision of the market value of 
her investments. Chevalier and Ellison (1995) find empirically, that premature IPOs allow the 
venture capitalist to more easily attract new investment capital. Furthermore, Gompers (1996) 
finds that the IPO‟s of younger venture capitalists suffer greater underpricing on average than 
those of reputable venture capitalists. 
Finally, the literature on venture capital moral hazard problems include the following: 
Trester (1998) studies the incentives of the entrepreneur to steal from the project under 
preferred equity and debt financing; Landskroner and Paroush (1995) show how an 
entrepreneur‟s own capital investment can make the venture capitalist more willing to equity-
finance the venture; Bergemann and Hege (1998) develop the optimal equity contract in a 
dynamic agency setting; and Casamatta (2003) examines the joint provision of effort by the 
entrepreneur and advisor (venture capitalist) to improve the productivity of the venture capital 
investment. 
  
III. Model Setup 
In this model, a risk-neutral entrepreneur who owns a firm and a one-time project, 
contracts with a risk-neutral venture capitalist who provides the project with external debt 
capital.  The venture capitalist, the agent in this model, operates in a perfectly competitive 
market for venture funding.  At time 0, nature chooses the type of the venture capitalist.  The 
venture capitalist can be of good type with probability p, or she can be of bad type with 
probability 1-p.  The entrepreneur, who is the principal in this model, offers a debt contract to 
the venture capitalist, while not knowing the venture capitalist‟s type. The venture capitalist 
can either accept or reject the entrepreneur‟s debt contract. 
If the venture capitalist accepts the contract, she is required to invest a certain amount 
„I‟ in the project, as the project can only proceed if an investment of I is made.  In this model, 
the project returns RL if unsuccessful and RH if successful, where RH > RL.  To make the 
analysis clearer, RL is assumed to equal 0, with no loss of generality, and RH is more simply 
denoted as R.  Therefore, at time 2, if the venture capitalist is of the good type, the project will 
return R with probability qG and 0 with probability 1-qG.  If the venture capitalist is of the bad 
type, the project will return R with probability qB and 0 with probability 1-qB.  We assume 
1>qG>qB>0, so that the project has a greater probability of success under the good type venture 
capitalist than under the bad type.  
At time 2, the project returns are realized and the venture capitalist receives a fixed 
wage, W(I), if the project has been successful, meaning that there is no default (i.e., R > W(I)) , 
and obtains full ownership of the future rents of the venture if the project fails, when default 
occurs with certainty. 
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A timeline for the project would look as follows: 
 
t=0   t=1       t=2     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The extensive form of the game is shown below, where the dashed lines denote the 
entrepreneur‟s information sets and project returns are realized at these information sets.  The 
values „VTX‟ represent the total value of the entrepreneurial firm when the venture capitalist is 
of type T and the project return is X.
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The model also considers the value of future rents „Z‟ that may come as a result of the 
ownership of the entrepreneurial firm.  Since we are concentrating our study on a simple 
adverse selection model, an assumption is made that the value of future rents is independent of 
the project outcome, and dependent only on the owner of the entrepreneurial venture at time 2. 
 
Thus: 
VGH = VBH = R - I + Z,   
VGL = -I + G  Z, 
VBL = -I + B  Z. 
We further note that 1 > G > B, meaning that the value of future rents is greater when 
the venture capitalist is of the good type than when she is of the bad type, but this value is 
                                                          
3
 Here, T denotes either G or B, and X denotes either H or L. 
Nature chooses 
venture capitalist 
type 
(unobserved by 
entrepreneur) 
Entrepreneur offers  
venture capitalist a debt 
contract. The project can 
move forward only if the 
capitalist accepts the 
contract and invests „I‟ in 
the venture. 
Outcome of the project is realized (R or 0). If the 
outcome is R, the capitalist is paid a fixed wage 
W(I) and the entrepreneur continues to own the 
firm. If the project returns 0, the entrepreneur 
defaults with certainty and ownership of the 
entrepreneurial firm goes to the venture capitalist. 
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VBL 
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H 
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greatest when the entrepreneur maintains ownership.
4
 Therefore, we are explicitly modeling the 
impact of firm ownership on the value of the future profitability of the firm, much the same 
way that we consider the impact of venture capitalist type on the chance of success of the one-
time project. If the venture capitalist is of the good type and the project is successful, then 
ownership of the firm remains with the entrepreneur and, consequently, the value at date 2 of 
the future rents from the firm is higher than if the project were unsuccessful and the good type 
of venture capitalist owned the firm. This is due to the entrepreneurial skill and knowledge 
possessed by the entrepreneur (and not possessed by the venture capitalist) that add value to the 
future rents of the firm. Also, if the venture capitalist is of the bad type, and the project is 
unsuccessful, ownership passes to the venture capitalist, and the value of the firm‟s future rents 
is strictly less than had the venture capitalist been of the good type, ceteris paribus. Therefore, 
as long as ownership remains with the entrepreneur, maximum social value is preserved.  This 
is evident in the relationship:  VGH = VBH > VGL > VBL. 
Moreover, if a non-debt contract were used, the ownership of the firm would always 
remain with the entrepreneur, and this would ensure the maximization of social wealth. Also, 
since the entrepreneur does not observe the type of the venture capitalist at the time of 
contracting, if the entrepreneur does not default, the fixed wage paid to the venture capitalist 
cannot depend upon the venture capitalist‟s type. Under default, however, the venture capitalist 
receives the ownership value of the future rents of the firm, and these do depend upon the 
venture capitalist‟s type, through factors G and B. 
In this paper, we investigate whether or not pooling and separating equilibria exist with 
a debt contract as outlined above. We therefore derive the contracts the entrepreneur needs to 
offer the venture capitalist, W(I).  We observe that under a debt contract the entrepreneur has a 
greater probability of default if she contracts with a bad type venture capitalist than if she 
contracts with a good type.  
 
IV. Pooling Equilibrium 
In this section we consider the values of W(I), the compensation for the venture 
capitalist when there is no default, that gives us a pooling equilibrium, i.e., one in which both 
types of venture capitalists agree to a debt investment in the entrepreneurial project.  
The ex-ante expected profit for the good type venture capitalist is calculated as follows: 
The project returns R, with probability qG, and the venture capitalist receives the full amount of 
the compensation W(I), so the expected profit of the venture capitalist without default is: 
 
 qG (W(I) – I). 
 
The project returns 0 with probability (1-qG), and the expected profit of the venture capitalist 
with default is:  
 
           (1-qG) (G  Z – I). 
 
Therefore, the rationality constraint implies: 
 
G = qG (W(I) – I) + (1-qG) (G Z – I)   0. 
                                                          
4
 Here G and B can be thought of as discount factors that reduce the value of future rents at time 2.  In our model, 
the discount factor under entrepreneurial ownership is normalized to one. 
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Rearranging the above equation gives the participation wage, W(I), for the good type of venture 
capitalist: 
 
W(I)    ( I – (1-qG) G Z  ) / qG.        (1) 
 
            The ex-ante expected profit for the bad type venture capitalist is calculated in the 
following way. The project returns R, with probability qB, and the venture capitalist receives 
the full amount of the compensation, W(I), so the expected profit of the venture capitalist 
without default is:   
 
             qB (W(I) – I). 
 
The project returns 0 with probability (1-qB), and the expected profit of the venture capitalist 
with default is:  
 
             (1-qB) (B  Z – I). 
 
Thus the ex-ante profit at date 0 for the bad type of venture capitalist is:    
 
B = qB (W(I) – I) + (1-qB) (B Z – I)   0. 
 
Similarly, rearranging the above equation gives the participation wage, W(I), for the bad type 
of venture capitalist: 
 
W(I)    ( I – (1-qB) B Z  ) / qB.        (2) 
 
           We know that G > B, since future rents are assumed to be greater under a good type 
venture capitalist than under a bad one.  We also know that qG > qB.  Therefore, a pooling 
equilibrium exists if both types of venture capitalists break even in equilibrium. This implies 
that equations (1) and (2) hold with equality. Hence, in order to have participation from both 
types of venture capitalists in equilibrium, the entrepreneur must offer a wage: 
 
W(I) = Max (W1(I), W2(I)), 
 
where W1(I) refers to W(I) in equation1), and W2(I) refers to W(I) in equation (2). 
 
We can now maximize the objective function, i.e., the expected wealth of the 
entrepreneur in a pooling equilibrium with respect to W(I): 
 
E = pqG (R + Z - W(I)) + (1-p)qB (R + Z - W(I) ) + p(1-qG)( 0 ) + (1-p)(1-qB) ( 0 ) 
 
      = (pqG + (1-p)qB)  (R + Z – W(I))  
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subject to the venture capitalist‟s constraint, 
 
            W(I) = Max (W1(I), W2(I)),  
 
and the entrepreneur‟s rationality constraint, 
   
            (pqG + (1-p)qB)  (R + Z – W(I))   Z,  
 
which yields 
 
W(I)        R – Z [ ( 1 - (pqG + (1-p)qB) ) / (pqG + (1-p)qB) ]. 
 
In equilibrium, since W(I) satisfies the rationality constraint of the entrepreneur, R > 
W(I) (the condition which ensures that no default occurs when the project is successful), and Z 
 0 (the future rents that the entrepreneur receives), the expected wealth of the entrepreneur is 
maximized when W(I) is minimized.  Thus, in a pooling equilibrium, the wage offered by the 
entrepreneur must satisfy the following expression: 
 
W(I)   = Max(W1(I), W2(I) )       R – Z [ ( 1 - (pqG + (1-p)qB)) / (pqG + (1-p)qB) ]. 
 
We also observe that this pooling equilibrium is only Nash when W(I) = W1(I) = W2(I). 
Thus if W1(I)  W2(I), the pooling equilibrium breaks down, and the entrepreneur chooses to 
offer the venture capitalist the lower of the two wages W1(I) or W2(I), which maximizes the 
entrepreneur‟s wealth function.  There is another pooling equilibrium in which neither one of 
the two venture capitalist types participate in the project, but it is easy to see that this 
equilibrium is Nash only when the entrepreneur‟s participation constraint is not satisfied. This 
pooling equilibrium will exist if and only if   
 
(pqG + (1-p)qB)  (R + Z – W(I))  < Z,           
  
where W(I) = min (W1(I), W2(I)).  Otherwise, the entrepreneur always wants to pursue 
the project and this second pooling equilibrium breaks down. 
 
V. Separating Equilibria 
In the previous section we considered the conditions under which a pooling equilibrium 
exists in an adverse selection setting. Here we consider the conditions under which separating 
equilibria may exist.  If W2(I) > W1(I), then in equilibrium the entrepreneur offers a wage W(I) 
= W1(I) in return for an initial investment of „I’ by the venture capitalist.  This implies that only 
the good type venture capitalist will accept the contract. 
 
The wealth of the entrepreneur given that only the good type venture capitalist accepts 
the contract is: 
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E|G = qG (R + Z – W1(I)) + (1-qG)( 0 )  
  
                    = qG (R + Z – W1(I) ). 
 
 In order for the separating equilibrium to exist with only the good type venture capitalist 
accepting the contract, we must have: 
 
W(I) = W1(I) < W2(I)  
 
and  
 
 qG (R + Z – W1(I) )   Z  (to satisfy the rationality constraint of the entrepreneur). 
 
Since the wage W(I) = W1(I) does not satisfy the participation constraint of the bad type venture 
capitalist in equilibrium, only the good type venture capitalist accept the contract. Therefore, 
we  have a separating equilibrium in which only the good type venture capitalist provides debt 
capital to the entrepreneurial firm. Similarly if W1(I) > W2(I), then the entrepreneur offers a 
wage W(I) = W2(I) in return for an initial investment of „I’ by the venture capitalist.  This 
implies that only the bad type venture capitalist accepts the debt contract offered by the 
entrepreneur.  The wealth of the entrepreneur given that only the bad type venture capitalist 
accepts the contract is: 
 
E|B = qB (R + Z – W1(I) ) + (1-qB) ( 0 ) 
  
                    = qB (R + Z – W2(I) ). 
 
In order for the separating equilibrium to exist with only the bad type venture capitalist 
accepting the contract, we must have: 
 
W(I) = W2(I) < W1(I)  
 
and  
 
qB (R + Z – W2(I) )   Z (to satisfy the rationality constraint of the entrepreneur). 
 
VI. Maximizing Social Wealth 
The ex-ante social wealth in a pooling equilibrium provided the project is undertaken is 
given by: 
SW = pqG VGH + (1-p)qBVBH + p(1-qG)VGL + (1-p)(1-qB)VBL 
 
        =  (pqG + (1-p)qB)  (R + Z)  + [ p(1-qG)  G  + (1-p)(1-qB)  B ] Z  - I. 
 
Since qG>qB and G > B, we can see that SW is maximized when p=1, i.e., when only the 
good type venture capitalist supplies debt financing. This implies that if W2(I) > W1(I), the 
social wealth of the firm is maximized.  Therefore, social wealth is not maximized under a 
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pooling equilibrium where both types of venture capitalists participate. This happens in a 
separating equilibrium in which the entrepreneur offers a wage W(I) = W1(I) < W2(I), which 
only the good type venture capitalist accepts. 
 
VII. Discussion 
The preceding analysis shows that under certain conditions, an entrepreneur may prefer 
to offer a contract to a bad quality venture capitalist (the second separating equilibrium). In 
order to better understand the different equilibrium outcomes, we plot in Figure 1 the 
participation wages for both bad and good venture capitalists against the future profitability of 
the firm (i.e. future rents, Z) for a given numerical example. The parameter values used for the 
numerical example are, I=20, R=100, qG =0.8, qB=0.5, G = 0.8, B=0.5. As can be seen from 
Figure 1, the reservation wages required by the good and bad venture capitalists, W1 and W2, 
respectively, decrease at different rates as the future profitability of the firm (Z) increases, and 
are equal when Z=50. Since the entrepreneur can maximize her payoff by choosing to pay the 
lower of the two wages, this implies that for values of Z less than 50 the entrepreneur pays a 
wage W1<W2, which only the good quality venture capitalist accepts (good separating 
equilibrium), for Z=50 the entrepreneur pays a wage W1=W2 which is accepted by both good 
and bad venture capitalists (pooling equilibrium), and for Z>50 the entrepreneur pays a wage 
W2<W1 accepted only by the bad quality venture capitalist (bad separating equilibrium).
5
 Thus, 
as the future profitability of the firm, Z, increases, the entrepreneur finds it increasingly more 
attractive to choose the bad quality venture capitalist. The reason for this is that under a bad 
quality venture capitalist, the project is less likely to be successful (i.e. qB<qG) and the bad 
quality venture capitalist will therefore be more likely to take over the firm. This means that 
when the firm has greater future profits, Z, the bad quality venture capitalist benefits more from 
the project than does the good quality venture capitalist, and therefore when the firm has 
sufficient future profitability, the bad quality venture capitalist requires a smaller wage than 
does the good quality one. Therefore, the example shows that with a debt contract more 
profitable ventures may be more likely to be funded by bad quality venture capitalists.  
The more general implication of this analysis is that it is possible to have only bad 
quality venture capitalists operating in the venture capital market. This is consistent with the 
finding of Gompers (1996) that IPOs performed by younger venture capitalists have greater 
underpricing, such that this underpricing may represent the reaction of an efficient market to 
IPOs of venture capitalists more likely to be of bad quality. Furthermore, the analysis indicates 
that entrepreneurs may not necessarily prefer venture capitalists that can maximize the success 
of a project and thus IPO proceeds (the good quality venture capitalists), if those venture 
capitalists are too expensive, i.e. if the good quality venture capitalists require higher wages 
than the bad quality ones (W1> W2). This also helps explain why in the presence of more 
established venture capital firms, entrepreneurs may prefer to do business with lesser known, 
and possibly bad quality venture capital firms. In any case, the analysis indicates that bad 
quality venture capitalists may not necessarily disappear from the market due to natural 
selection, as Gompers (1996) implies.  
                                                          
5
 For the values used in the numerical example, the rationality constraint of the entrepreneur was satisfied under 
both the bad and good venture capitalists. Thus, the entrepreneur could choose to pay the venture capitalist 
whatever wage maximized the entrepreneur‟s payoff (the smaller of W1 and W2). 
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VIII. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we examine the problem of debt contracting in an adverse selection 
environment involving an entrepreneur who plans to finance a project using venture debt 
capital.  We find that a pooling equilibrium under which both good and bad types of venture 
capitalists participate requires that the „fixed‟ wages satisfying the rationality constraint of both 
types of venture capitalist be equal.  When the rationality constraint satisfying wages are not 
equal, the pooling equilibrium breaks down and one of two separating equilibria obtain. The 
social wealth maximizing equilibrium is a separating one under which only the good type of 
venture capitalist provides debt capital to the entrepreneurial project. Furthermore, the 
existence of a separating equilibrium with bad quality venture capitalists is used to explain the 
survival of less reputable venture capital firms in the marketplace. Finally, a numerical example 
demonstrates how the entrepreneurs of more profitable ventures may prefer to do business with 
bad quality venture capitalists. 
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Figure 1
Future Firm Profitability and Entrepreneur's Choice of Venture Capitalist
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Note: The parameter values used for this example are: investment (I) = 20, project return (R) = 100, probability of 
project success under good quality venture capitalist (qG) = 0.8, probability of project success under bad quality 
venture capitalist (qB) = 0.5, discount factor for good quality venture capitalist (G) = 0.8, discount factor for bad 
quality venture capitalist (B) = 0.5. 
